Business Law by Simmons, John S. & Muller, Douglas M.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 38 Issue 1 Article 4 
Fall 1986 
Business Law 
John S. Simmons 
Douglas M. Muller 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John S. Simmons & Douglas M. Muller, Business Law, 38 S. C. L. Rev. 11 (1986). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
BUSINESS LAW
I. EQUITABLE EXCEPTION TO SIGNATURE WARRANTY PROVISION
RECOGNIZED
In Bankers Trust v. South Carolina National Bank1 the
South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized an equitable excep-
tion to the presentment warranty provision of section 36-4-207
of the South Carolina Code.' This case provides a background
for an analysis of the applicability of equitable principles in
cases governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).
The problem arose when Bankers Trust loaned $21,500 to
three individuals for the purchase of a houseboat. The individu-
als misrepresented the purchase price of the boat as $28,900
when it was actually $13,500. Bankers Trust issued a check pay-
able to the three men and the seller of the boat and received a
promissory note due in 180 days.
The three individuals forged the seller's signature, opened a
checking account with South Carolina National Bank (SCN),
and deposited the $21,500 check. They promptly obtained a
cashier's check for $13,500 and paid the seller his full purchase
price. In the meantime, SCN forwarded the check containing the
forged endorsement to Bankers Trust.' After the note matured
and was not paid, Bankers Trust repossessed the houseboat and
received $14,000 in proceeds. Bankers Trust applied $7500 of
this to the men's account after paying collection and attorney's
fees. Deficiency judgments were also entered against the three
men on other unpaid notes.
4
Bankers Trust discovered the forgery of the seller's signa-
ture and obtained an affidavit from him. Upon receiving the affi-
davit and forged check, SCN paid the full amount pursuant to
1. 284 S.C. 238, 325 S.E.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1985).
2. This section provides a warranty in which a collecting bank (e.g., SCN) guaran-
tees to a payor bank (e.g., Bankers Trust) that all signatures are genuine. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-4-207 (1976).
3. 284 S.C. at 241, 325 S.E.2d at 83.
4. Id.
1
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section 36-4-207." SCN later obtained the seller's endorsement
of the checks and requested the return of the $21,500 it had pre-
viously paid. Bankers Trust declined to return the money and
instead brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the
status of the proceeds from the boat sale regarding the other
debts of the three men. SCN counterclaimed for the return of
the $21,500, but made no claim for the proceeds. The trial court
allowed Bankers Trust to retain the proceeds, but determined
that equity required Bankers Trust to return the $21,500 and
bear the loss from the three men's fraud.
On appeal Bankers Trust initially contended that the issue
should be resolved by the clear language of the UCC. Bankers
Trust argued that when SCN cured the forgery, SCN was merely
presenting the check for repayment, and that since SCN was not
a holder in due course, it stood in the same position as the three
men.8 The court summarily dismissed this reasoning, pointing
out that once Bankers Trust paid the check, neither party could
assert a right to recover losses under the check.'
The court concluded, however, that SCN could cure its
breach of the presentment warranty by ratifying the forged sig-
nature of the seller. 10 More importantly, the court recognized an
equitable exception to the warranty provision of section 36-4-207
by stating that when the payee of a forged check (the seller of
the boat in Bankers Trust) receives the proceeds, no cause of
action may be brought on the endorsement since the funds have
reached the intended party."" In this case, Bankers Trust could
not keep the $21,500 because the loss was determined to be from
its dealings with the three men and not from the forgery.
This cases raises the question of the applicability of princi-
ples of equity in South Carolina cases falling within the UCC.
Although section 36-1-10312 outlines the general application of
5. Id.
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-404 (1976) provides that an unauthorized signature may be
ratified by the person whose name was forged.
7. 284 S.C. at 241, 325 S.E.2d at 83.
8. Id. at 242, 325 S.E.2d at 84.
9. Id.
10. Although not recognized by the court, S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-404 official com-
ment 3 (1976) explicitly states that this ratification is to be retroactive.
11. 284 S.C. at 244, 325 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Atlantic Bank of New York v. Israel
Discount Bank, 108 Misc. 2d 342, 441 N.Y.S.2d 315 (App. Term 1981).
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-103 (1976) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular
[Vol. 38
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equity under the UCC, the section was not cited by the court.
SCN argued that the principles of equity supplemented the lan-
guage of the UCC.13 Conversely, Bankers Trust argued that sec-
tion 36-1-103 applies only when the Code itself does not come
into play.14 Even though the court did not acknowledge consid-
eration of section 36-1-103, it clearly stated that Bankers Trust
had a right to recover under the presentment warranty when it
discovered the fraud.15
The key phrase of section 36-1-103 is the "displaced" provi-
sion at the beginning of the statute which allows judges to utilize
the section and reach equitable results without creating judicial
exceptions.-6 A broad reading of the section suggests that the
provision applies if the particular code provision does not dis-
place equity.17 The section can also be interpreted to dictate
that courts resort to equity only in instances when a code provi-
sion on point does not exist. Bankers Trust urged this latter,
"gap filler" interpretation. 8
In explaining its conclusion, the Bankers Trust court em-
phasized that "the courts have developed an equitable exception
... ,9 This language seems to suggest a judicially created ex-
ception and possibly indicates why the court did not seek the
assistance of section 36-1-103 in its decision. This result is un-
fortunate because an interpretation of section 36-1-103 would
tend to promote stability in questions concerning the application
of equitable theories in cases under the Uniform Commercial
Code. Through the utilization of a court-created exception, the
provisions of this act, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principle and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepre-
sentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause
shall supplement its provisions."
13. Brief of Respondent at 11. SCN asserted that the claim was one of unjust en-
richment. 284 S.C. at 242, 325 S.E.2d at 83.
14. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3.
15. 284 S.C. at 243, 325 S.E.2d at 84.
16. See supra note 12.
17. This interpretation advances the theory that "supplement," as used in section
36-1-103, is not to be construed narrowly. Support for this rationale is found in the use
of the term "invalidating" in the section, for the precise meaning of the word points to
an exception rather than a mere "gap filler." The additional equitable principles outlined
in the section also refer to doctrines which are exceptions rather than supplemental
terms.
18. Reply Brief of Appellant at 3.
19. 284 S.C. at 244, 325 S.E.2d at 85.
19861
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application of equity is probably limited to the unique fact situ-
ation presented in this case.
John S. Simmons
II. "No NOTICE" PROVISION OF ACCELERATION CLAUSE
ENFORCED
A number of states have enforced acceleration clauses in in-
struments of indebtedness unless those provisions are clearly in-
equitable.20 In Allendale Furniture Co. v. Carolina Commercial
Bank21 the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed its posi-
tion within this group by holding that when a note contains a
provision for accelerating the maturity of the debt upon default
without further notice, the creditor's rejection of an untimely
payment is sufficient to notify the debtor of the election to ac-
celerate. 22 The court also eliminated the application of the "eq-
uitable tender" rule to this contractual provision.23
Allendale involved a $75,000 note and real estate mortgage
given by Allendale Furniture Company (Allendale) to Carolina
Commercial Bank (the bank), payable in monthly installments
on the first of each month. The note contained a provision al-
lowing acceleration of the entire debt upon default at the option
of the holder and "without further notice" to the mortgagor.24
Although the initial payments by Allendale were timely, the
payments became increasingly sporadic after September 1976.
The bank notified Allendale on numerous occasions of the need
for compliance with the note but it continued accepting late
payments. When Allendale tendered its February payment on
February 22, 1980, the bank advised the company in writing that
the bank's attorney would contact it regarding the account. The
bank had given the note and mortgage to its attorney for fore-
20. See Frei v. Hamilton, 123 Ariz. 544, 601 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1979); Duncan v.
Lagunas, 283 Ga. 61, 316 S;E.2d 747 (1984); Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Kil-
leen, 377 Mass. 100, 384 N.E.2d 1231 (1979); Real Estate Exch. v. Bacci, 676 S.W.2d 440
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Valley v. Patterson, 614 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981).
21. 284 S.C. 76, 325 S.E.2d 530 (1985).
22. Id. at 80, 325 S.E.2d at 532.
23. Id. at 79, 325 S.E.2d at 531.
24. Master's Report at 41.
[Vol. 38
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/4
1986] BUSINESS LAW
closure on February 14, 1980.25
The circuit court affirmed the master's recommendation of
foreclosure but the court of appeals reversed in a divided deci-
sion.26 The court of appeals refused to apply Allendale's theory
of equitable estoppel and found that Allendale had cured its de-
fault by tendering its late payment before it was notified of the
bank's election to accelerate.2 7 The court disregarded the word-
ing of the acceleration clause and stated that the bank did not
give an "affirmative, unequivocal act" that would appraise the
debtor of its election to accelerate. 28 The supreme court re-
versed, citing Dargan v. Metropolitan Properties, Inc.29 in sup-
port of its view that the election to accelerate need not be com-
municated to the debtor after default when the acceleration
clause contained the language "without further notice." 30
The supreme court's insistence on following the language in
the note has been echoed by other courts and follows well-estab-
lished case law.3' In Collins v. Collins Estate, Inc.32 the court
stated that "[a]n acceleration clause of the nature stipulated in
appellant's note is not uncommon in instruments of indebted-
ness and generally will be enforced as written."' s3 South Caro-
lina's strict enforcement of these clauses is not unique and is
25. Record at 6-11.
26. Carolina Commercial Bank v. Allendale Furniture Co., 280 S.C. 247, 312 S.E,2d
569 (Ct. App. 1984).
27. Id. at 253, 312 S.E.2d at 572.
28. Id. at 251-52, 312 S.E.2d at 571-72.
29. 243 S.C. 324, 133 S.E.2d 821 (1963). Dargan is an example of the supreme
court's unwillingness to grant equitable relief. In Dargan the corporate mortgagor had
made payments of $11,000 in excess of the annual payment required, but was one day
late on a payment after a sixty-day grace period had expired and had failed to include
interest on accrued interest in its late payment. In addition, the corporation's president
had been hospitalized. Despite these facts, the court denied equitable relief. Id. at 330,
133 S.E.2d at 824; see also Shirley v. Parris, 121 S.C. 260, 113 S.E. 788 (1922).
30. 284 S.C. at 78, 325 S.E.2d at 531. The court distinguished a Georgia case on the
ground that the note in that case did not involve the type of acceleration clause in Allen-
dale. See Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 190 S.E. 564 (1937). Lee involved a note and
purchase contract for a parcel of land. Although the contract recited that the note con-
tained a waiver of notice provision, the actual note did not. The Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that the note should prevail over the recital in the contract; thus, the accelera-
tion clause contained no waiver of notice provision. Id. at 45, 190 S.E.2d at 565.
31. Duncan v. Lagunas, 253 Ga. 61, 316 S.E.2d 747 (1984); Berry v. Caldwell, 121
S.C. 418, 114 S.E. 405 (1922); Real Estate Exch. v. Bacci, 676 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
32. 207 S.C. 452, 36 S.E.2d 584 (1946).
33. Id. at 458, 36 S.E.2d at 586.
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based on the need for commercial stability. Because commercial
banks frequently engage in financing transactions, the form of
their agreement should be upheld unless it is inequitable.
3 4 If
the provision in a note was ignored, the court might be inadver-
tently encouraging debtor delinquency and increasing litiga-
tion.3 The need for stability in commercial transactions over-
rides the need for protection from hardship in all but the most
inequitable situations. Other courts have reached similar conclu-
sions based on the same factors.36
Nevertheless, the supreme court's statement in Allendale
that "tender of anything less than the full accelerated amount
will not cure the default"37 represents a substantial variation
from the general rule that tender of the payment in arrears, if
made before the creditor's election to accelerate, will prevent
foreclosure.38 The theory behind this rule is that after tender
there is no longer any default, which is the prerequisite of the
right to accelerate.39 Prior to Allendale, the rule in South Caro-
lina was that, once the creditor had the right to commence fore-
closure, this right could not be removed by partial tender.40
Rather than reading "partial tender" as partial tender of the
payment in arrears, the court in Allendale interpreted this lan-
guage to mean partial tender of the entire accelerated amount.
4 1
Thus, nothing less than the "full accelerated amount" will cure
default.
Although the rule in most jurisdictions allows tender of the
payment in arrears to cure default,42 the court in Allendale ef-
fectively eliminates this approach. In Allendale the election to
accelerate occurs automatically upon default because of specific
language in the acceleration clause.43 If this language does not
exist or if the clause requires notice, the election to accelerate
34. See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 HAV. L. REV. 747, 750
(1919).
35. See Carolina Commercial Bank v. Allendale Furniture Co., 280 S.C. 247, 312
S.E.2d 569 (Ct. App. 1984)(Shaw, J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Fulton Nat'1 Bank v. Horn, 239 Ga. 648, 238 S.E.2d 358 (1977).
37. 284 S.C. at 79, 325 S.E.2d at 531.
38. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 495(6)(b) (1955).
39. 280 S.C. at 251, 312 S.E.2d at 571.
40. Dargan, 243 S.C. at 329, 133 S.E.2d at 823 (1963).
41. 284 S.C. at 79, 325 S.E.2d at 531.
42. See supra note 38.
43. 284 S.C. at 77, 325 S.E.2d at 530-31.
[Vol. 38
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol38/iss1/4
BUSINESS LAW
may need to be communicated to the debtor in order to be effec-
tive. In this situation, tender of the arrearage can be made
before the creditor has exercised his option, rather than after
the election, which was the case in Allendale. If tender is made
before this election, South Carolina courts may apply the gen-
eral rule rather than the rule used in Allendale, and the default
would be cured.
The supreme court's decision in Allendale is exceedingly
harsh for debtors, primarily because it gives the creditor unbri-
dled discretion to accelerate, even in minor cases of default. Eq-
uitable relief is also not readily available.44 The decision, how-
ever, may be limited to its facts, especially in light of the court's
emphasis on the language in the note. The practitioner should
look to the form of the financing agreement in order to protect
his client. South Carolina courts may favor the common-law ap-
proach if the acceleration clause does not contain the type of
provision described in Allendale.
Douglas Manning Muller
III. PROCEDURAL ERRORS RESULT IN ENFORCEMENT OF "DuE-
ON-SALE" CLAUSE
In Security Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Cole-
man4"5 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a lending
institution could enforce a "due-on-sale" clause in a mortgage
against a subsequent purchaser of the mortgaged property.
4'
Security Federal brought the action seeking the foreclosure
of a mortgage which it originally entered into with the
Colemans. Although the Colemans were the named defendants,
they made no appearance in the case. The defendants who con-
tested the action, the Howells, purchased the home from the
Colemans by paying them $10,000 and assumed the mortgage.
The agreement entered into by the Colemans and Howells con-
tained a "whereas" provision which stated that the sellers, the
Colemans, believed paragraph seventeen of the mortgage was vi-
olated by the agreement. Paragraph seventeen contained a stan-
44. See supra note 29.
45. 284 S.C. 394, 325 S.E.2d 546 (1985).
46. Id. at 396, 325 S.E.2d at 547.
19861
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dard "due-on-sale" clause that the lender, Security Federal,
could exercise at its option if the borrower transferred the prop-
erty without the lender's written consent.
One month after the defendants entered into the sale agree-
ment, Security Federal received the Howell's insurance policy
along with a cover letter explaining that the Howells had as-
sumed the Colemans' loan. For the next fifteen months, the
Howells made payments on a timely basis and also made im-
provements to the property worth approximately $10,000. Nev-
ertheless, Security Federal notified the Howells that it was exer-
cising the "due-on-sale" provision to accelerate the balance
due.47
The master determined that, although the agreement noti-
fied the Howells of the "due-on-sale" clause at all relevant
times,48 Security Federal was estopped from enforcing the clause
because its acceptance of the monthly payments constituted
waiver of the option to accelerate.49
The circuit court disagreed, finding estoppel inapplicable
because no false representation or concealment was shown.
Moreover, the court noted that the Howells had possessed
knowledge of the "due-on-sale" clause. 50 The trial judge also
noted that no implied waiver was established because the How-
ells failed to illustrate an intention on the part of Security Fed-
eral to waive its rights under the option provision.5 1 Finally, he
rejected the defense of laches,52 a ground upon which the master
had ruled favorably." The circuit court, however, held that since
the foreclosure was an action in equity, the Howells would, in
fairness, be allowed to refinance the house at the interest rate in
effect at the time of the agreement. 4
47. There apparently was no dispute over the fact that Security Federal utilized the
"due-on.sale" clause in order to receive a higher rate of interest. The supreme court
characterized the reason as an "earnings crunch." See id.
48. About one year after the agreement, Security Federal sent letters to attorneys
and realtors in the area advising them not to enter into mortgage-assuming transactions.
Record at 15.
49. Id. at 20-21.
50. Id. at 7.
51. Id. at 8.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 23-24.
54. Id. at 9. The original mortgage to the Colemans was a fixed nine percent rate of
interest for 30 years. Id. at 11. At the time of the agreement, Security Federal's rate was
[Vol. 38
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Security Federal then appealed to the supreme court, chal-
lenging the circuit court's decision to refinance the house. A key
mistake made by the Howells was their failure to appeal any
findings of the trial judge. The brief of the defendant reflects
that the Howells then attempted to adopt the findings of the
master . 5 This maneuver was rejected by the supreme court in a
stern footnote 6 and was a significant factor in the court's hold-
ing that Security Federal did not have to refinance the
mortgage.
In rendering his decision, Justice Gregory also emphasized
Security Federal's second argument based on a party's right to
contract with one of his own choosing. The supreme court did
not directly express an opinion regarding the enforceability of
"due-on-sale" clauses in general; this issue, however, would not
appear to be as debatable as it was in the past.
5 7
Although the "due-on-sale" clause appears to be a lawful
provision and has survived arguments that it constitutes a re-
straint on alienation, 58 Security Federal Savings and Loan high-
lights the difficulties that arise when a party makes procedural
errors. Since the court's footnote appears to suggest that the
master's arguments were valid,59 attorneys facing similar situa-
tions would be well advised to pursue vigorously the defenses of
equitable estoppel, implied waiver, and laches when faced with
similar litigation. If the defendants in Security Federal Savings
12%. Id. at 9.
55. Brief of Respondent at 6.
56. The court stated:
In their brief, respondents purport to adopt the findings of the master;
however, there has been no exception taken from the trial judge's express re-
jection of the master's report. While we agree that appellant's conduct ignores
good business ethics, the absence of a proper exception by respondents leaves
nothing before this Court for decision.
284 S.C. at 396 n.1, 325 S.E.2d at 547 n.1 (citations omitted).
57. See, e.g., Williams v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir.
1981); Helms v. Fulton Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 167 Ga. App. 178, 305 S.E.2d 825
(1983).
58. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), in
which the Supreme Court held that the "Wellenkamp doctrine" does not apply to fed-
eral savings and loan associations. In Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582
P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978), the California Supreme Court held that a "due-on-
sale" clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
59. See supra note 56.
1986]
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and Loan had properly presented these arguments, a contrary
result may have been reached.
John S. Simmons
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